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Actual and potential gifts: Shadow gift relations, critique, and the virtual domain of the 
ungiven1  
 
 
Abstract: 
 
What is given may be evaluated in relation to what might have been given but was not. The 
central thematic of this essay is what we term the shadow gift relation (as distinct from the 
more standard anthropological gift relation among exchange partner dyads) between the 
gift that is given and that which remains ungiven -- with the latter, both present and not 
present, coming to haunt and unsettle the former. The potential of the gift is key for it is 
intimately related to critique: we explore how the relation between the virtual ungiven and 
what is actually given may come to form the basis of social criticism. This essay, then, 
defines a kind of ‘keeping while giving’ that is related to but different from that famously 
elaborated by Annette Weiner, for what is kept back, in the cases we discuss in this essay, 
are virtual (imagined) forms of gift. Giving is a technology of the imagination because it is a 
process which precipitates the imagination of a relation between an actual gift and a double 
that is virtual but nonetheless real because it exists in the form of a manifold of potentials 
for how the gift could be. 
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Introduction 
 
In 2010 the novelist Howard Jacobson won the UK’s most prestigious book prize 
competition, the Man Booker Prize, for his novel The Finkler Question. Although it was his 
first win, it was not the first time he had been nominated. Accepting the award, Jacobson 
said: ‘I’m speechless. Fortunately, I prepared one earlier. It’s dated 1983. That’s how long 
the wait’s been. And I see here that there’s another altered acceptance speech from 1994, 
then 2002, which I appear to have amended only slightly for 2004, 2006 and 2008. I note 
that my language in these speeches grows less gracious with the years. You start to want to 
blame the judges who have given you the prize for all the prizes they didn’t give you…. they 
aren’t of course the same judges. Tonight, I forgive everyone. They were only doing their 
job, those judges, every one of whose names I could reel off. And as for the judges of the 
2010 Man Booker Prize, they surpass all praise. I thank them’.2  
 
Jacobson, while clearly delighted, acknowledges and gives bittersweet voice to the pathos 
associated with those previous times he was nominated for but not awarded the prize: 
those ‘might have been’ honours. What he was given – the prize that he was awarded in 
                                                     
1 Our thanks to Arkotong Longkumer, John Hagström, Diego Malara, Adam Reed, Aimée Joyce, and Marilyn 
Strathern for helpful suggestions. The editorial care and attention of Julia Eckert played a vital role in allowing 
us to refine the argument – we are most grateful.  
2 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zj_lXwSf2CY   
 2 
actuality -- is evaluated, with humour and pathos, in relation to the prizes he might have 
won, but did not. Indeed, Jacobson’s concern with unawarded prizes, even in the moment 
of his triumph, points us towards the central thematic of this essay, which is what we term 
the shadow gift relation (as distinct from the more standard anthropological gift relation 
among exchange partner dyads). The shadow gift relation is the relation that is conjured in 
specific forms of commentary on the gift between the gift that is given and that which 
remains ungiven. The latter, both present and not present, may come to haunt and unsettle 
the former. Such a relation may (be made to) form a relation of critique. It is this relation 
that we seek to draw out in this essay.  
 
To consider such shadow gift relations is to consider gifts in terms of how what is given is 
conceptually only one element of what might have been given. Thus, the potential of the 
gift is at the heart of our analysis. Consequently, so is critique. We explore how the relation 
between the virtual, ungiven totality (from which the given element is obtained) and what is 
actually given may come to form the basis of social criticism. We treat the virtual and the 
potential here as mutually implicated: in this we follow Jon Bialecki’s (2012: 307) reading of 
Deleuze’s (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007: 148–52) concept of the virtual ‘as a way of speaking 
about an unquantifiable field of generative potential in being and thought, a potential 
intelligible yet specifically undeterminable in advance of development’. We develop this 
concept of the virtual with the caveat that though the field of the gift’s generative potential 
is indeed objectively unquantifiable and undeterminable, it can still be imagined. Indeed, we 
treat the gift as a technology of the imagination since the gift is a key ‘social and material 
means by which particular imaginings are generated’ (Sneath, Holbraad and Pedersen, 
2009: 6) – a concrete process engendering ‘the ability to bring to mind that which is not 
entirely present to the senses’ (ibid: 12) – namely, in this essay, a gift’s shadow or virtual 
form as a field of generative potential. The ungiven, then, defines a kind of ‘keeping while 
giving’ that is related to but different from that famously elaborated by Annette Weiner 
(1985, 1992), for what is kept back, in the cases we discuss here, are virtual forms of gift. 
Weiner, as is well known, discloses classes of inalienable possessions: those which are never 
exchanged and those that are exchanged but remain connected to their real owners (1985: 
212). Like Weiner, we are interested less in the relation between exchange partners than 
that between the given and the withheld. But if Weiner’s treatment of this problem was 
through the lens of their relative alienability or inalienability, and ours through that of their 
relative proportions (and moral evaluations thereof), both projects seek to show that the 
relationship between exchange partners is far from being all that matters in gift-exchange. 
 
Drawing on the insights of economic anthropologist John Davis (1992), Alberto Corsín 
Jiménez focuses on partonomies in and out of balance in material exchanges, observing that 
‘the part that we give is an indication of the whole that is not given – what you see (the gift) 
is what you do not get (the larger social whole). Gift-giving is thus an expression and effect 
of proportionality’ (2008: 186).3 We note that Davis (1992: 39) emphasised the socially 
defined nature of partonomies which depend on ‘local criteria of relevance: they are not 
scientific or objective’. This should be borne in mind when we refer to ‘wholes’: they are an 
aspect of the imagination -- the image one has of the (size of) resources available to an 
                                                     
3 Partonomies are hierarchies of part-whole relationships, often contrasted with ‘kind of’ taxonomic relations: 
these ‘two modes of decomposition reflect two general forms of organization of knowledge, taxonomic, that 
is, subdivision into kinds, and partonomic, that is, subdivision into parts’ (Tversky 1989: 983).  
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entity for giving. In fact, rather than ‘whole’ we might prefer the terms ‘entity’ or 
‘phenomenon’ (Thornton 2017). If we continue to refer to ‘wholes’ in our analysis, it is not 
as a pre-determined entity, but rather as a kind of virtuality. The gift emerges as a kind of 
actor here, but not in the classic Maussian sense by means of containing and extending the 
animate personhood of its giver. Rather, gifts comment on their own pathos in 
demonstrating limits and constraints in commitment and largesse and embodying their 
critique (‘what you see (the gift) is what you do not get’). Following from this, to enable a 
proportional perspective on the gift is to view it as always part of noetic ‘could be’-offerings 
that can be made to produce critical effects: if gift-giving is an expression and effect of 
proportionality, the proportions of the gift are subject to moral evaluations and demands. 
The gift is a portion or element, but an element of what? The simplest answer would be: the 
imagination. We note that a shadow gift relation may take not only a proportional form but 
also a taxonomic one: a gift’s can be or might have been other can equally be a question of 
order as proportions. Our focus, which is mainly on the latter, is a function of the case-
studies we have had to hand rather than a conceptual point of order.  
 
Since our focus is on how divergences between the gift that is given and the multitude of 
unpotentiated, ungiven gifts can come to form the basis of critical social commentary, this 
essay forms part of a growing body of work in anthropology on techniques and practices of 
critique (Boland 2013a, Bialecki 2018, Copeman 2018, cf. Boltanski 2010) by offering new 
perspectives on critical forms of giving. ‘Critical’ because the ungiven gift, as the negative 
Other of the given, is capable of stimulating critical commentary on that which is actually 
proffered. Since such a relation is invisible but imaginable, and at the same time not the 
kind of gift relation usually considered by anthropologists, we term it a shadow gift relation.   
 
We do not at all suggest that this relation and its critical function is all that matters in acts of 
giving. Our aim is simply to open up other aspects of giving: not seeking to advance a 
critique of theories of the gift but to understand how the gift itself critiques.4 Further, our 
concern is less with the kind of gift-giving that entails obvious signs of reciprocity or sense of 
a cycle than it is with contributions made in order ‘to support the upliftment of individuals 
and communities […] that might be glossed as expressive of charitable or philanthropic 
dispositions’ (Osella 2018: 8); what Maurice Godelier (1999: 5) has called the ‘modernised’ 
gift, which if it creates a bond at all is one that is ‘between abstract subjects’. Of course, no 
neat distinction exists between the charitable gift and the ‘gift that makes friends’ (Mauss’s 
foundational text was after all ‘an exploration of the paradoxical character of the gift’ 
[Laidlaw 2000: 620]), and Godelier’s modernised gift may not be so modern after all, given 
its overlaps and parallels with longstanding gift modalities in various local contexts (Osella 
2018: 8). Nevertheless, the sorts of gift that ‘create, maintain and strengthen various social 
bonds’ (Yan 2005: 246) are not our main focus, even if the concepts we explore may be 
revealingly applied to them. One could object: most actions carry with them the ghosts of 
their unfulfilled alternatives, and everything potentially is something else. That may be the 
case, but gifts, and especially material transfers of wealth performed unilaterally with the 
                                                     
4 While charitable giving may critique quite conventionally in the sense of drawing attention to the human 
suffering it usually seeks to repair (a kind of critique by default or implication), this point does not apply to all 
‘philanthropic’ acts. For example, the feeding of the poor in temples in India or the giving of alms does not 
necessarily wage a critique of suffering, but instead may take suffering as a condition of the world, and an 
opportunity for the exercise of dharma. Here, suffering is naturalized, not critiqued. 
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professed intention of alleviating suffering (viz. philanthropic and/or charitable gifts), are 
particularly subject to moral evaluation in relation to what could have been done in place of 
what is actually done.  
 
The shadow gift relation may be expressed in terms of the hauntedness of the gift. The 
actualized gift possesses a kind of ‘as if’, noetic dimension -- an imaginative space teeming 
with alternatives to the actually given gift.5 Haunted by those alternatives, the gift can come 
to appear ‘beside itself, disadjusted’ (Derrida 1993: 20). Our point, following Derrida’s  
‘hauntological’ explorations, is simply that the gift is scarcely as obviously itself as it might 
seem.6 If our language of ghostly and phantom gifts might appear to be over-stating the 
matter, we will see quite literally in one of our case studies how the ungiven gift may be 
made to equate with unsaved lives.  
 
Significantly, the actually given gift is frequently subject to comparison along an axis of 
possibilities and potentials as a form of rhetoric. Virtual comparisons are formed between 
the actualised instance and its could be or could have been counterparts. We are concerned 
here with moral evaluation of giving episodes. Like us, Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov and Olga 
Sosnina (2004) focus less on the problematic of reciprocity than on the rhetorical properties 
of giving. Gifts demonstrate ‘facts’ – ‘matters of fact’ are demonstrable through the giving 
of ‘facts of matter’. Gifts operate (are evaluated) as figures of commitment. A gift may 
demonstrate commitment, but if its proportional structure is ‘off-kilter’ (say, Jeff Bezos 
offers only a single dollar to a beggar), then it may, of course, signal the very opposite. Is the 
level of a donation ‘appropriately compassionate’ (Berlant 2004: 10) given what we think we 
know about the resources available to the donor in question? What is being withheld even 
as a gift is given? This is to say, public donations invite comments and assessment; they are 
taken to demonstrate something. Demonstration necessitates an act of witnessing with two 
dimensions: ‘The first implies proof: by performing evidence for an audience, the truth of a 
hypothesis is demonstrated. The second, associated with a “demo”, displays a not yet 
actualized real object, by showing what is possible’ (Kelly 2003: 35). Ann Kelly’s insight here, 
in tandem with the viewpoint proposed by Ssorin-Chaikov and Sosnina, allows us to observe 
the bifocal temporality of a gift understood hauntologically: looking backwards towards 
what might have been given, and forwards to what might still be given. The gift comes into 
view as a species of rhetoric and commentary (to which it is also subject), the discursive 
purchase of which arises from the imagined relation between the actually given and an 
ungiven that haunts it. 
 
The (un)given gift as a subject of moral deliberation of course recalls recent debates in the 
anthropology of ethics, and much more longstanding ones in moral philosophy, concerning 
the relation between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ (Beldo 2014). As John Ladd (1957: 86) perspicuously 
remarked: ‘We do not think it possible for a person to be obligated to do something outside 
his power… This follows from the generally acknowledged principle that in some sense 
                                                     
5 A paraphrase of Amsterdam and Bruner (2000: 237).  
6 See Frederic Jameson’s helpful gloss: ‘[Hauntological] spectrality does not involve the conviction that ghosts 
exist or that the past (and maybe even the future they offer to prophesy) is still very much alive and at work, 
within the living present: all it says, if it can be thought to speak, is that the living present is scarcely as self-
sufficient as it claims to be; that we would do well not to count on its density and solidity, which might under 
exceptional circumstances betray us’ (Jameson 1999: 39). 
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“ought” implies “can.’” Indeed, the kinds of ‘otherwise-’ – or, indeed, ‘ought-’ - gift we 
discuss in this essay only become intelligible in this light, with the imagined capacities of 
givers of course central to the sorts of commentary and evaluation attracted by gift 
transfers. If the giver of an actual gift is considered to be without the means of giving an 
alternative version of it, then an ‘ought’-gift is unintelligible. Only where the possibility of a 
different gift exists do ‘can’ and ‘ought’ come into play with, to reverse Ladd’s formulation, 
‘can’ coming logically to imply ‘ought’. This can be problematic – as when the ‘can’ of giving 
a kidney (the medical possibility of doing so) seems to pass into an obligation to do just that; 
what we call, adapting Sharon Kaufman’s (2013) terminology, the tyranny of the potential 
gift. But equally, identifying unrealized giving potentials can be efficacious in holding people 
and institutions to account; i.e. in forming the basis of moral critique of inadequate or 
undelivered ‘is’ (i.e. actual) gifts.7  
 
 
Foreign Aid and Philanthropy 
 
In this section we consider contemporary debates about: (i) the proportions of a country’s 
spending on foreign development aid, and (ii) high-profile philanthropic donations. We see 
in each case that the debates are animated by proportionally informed evaluations, or a 
‘proportional ethics’ (Corsín Jiménez 2008), that critically frame philanthropy and aid gifting 
as problematics of the ungiven. The perspective we develop sees actualised gifts of aid 
and/or philanthropy as disturbed and unsettled by their own virtual ungiven forms.  
 
To begin with international aid: The proportion spent by the UK on overseas development 
aid (ODA) is currently 0.7% of national income (i.e. for every ten pounds that is made in the 
UK, 7p goes towards foreign aid). For David Cameron’s conservative government (2010-
2016), reaching a target of 0.7% was a flagship policy, and once reached, a move was made 
to enshrine it in law, and it is now legally binding for a government to allocate a proportion 
of national income for this purpose no less than this figure. The commitment occasioned 
heated debate in part due to the UK recession that was concurrent with it, and the 
conservative government’s ‘austerity’ policies which saw almost all other state funding 
allocations drastically diminish even as its foreign aid spending continued to rise in order to 
meet the 0.7% target. An online petition begun by rightwing newspaper The Mail on 
Sunday, signed by more than 200,000 people, put it thus: ‘Despite spending cuts at home 
the Government is committed to hand over 0.7% of national income in overseas aid, 
regardless of need… UK handouts [therefore] will rise from current £12bn to £16bn by 2020. 
This is by far the highest rate of any G20 nation and is leading to huge waste and 
corruption’.8 As one would expect, however, many others lauded the increase in the state’s 
‘gift of aid’, with other newspapers publishing international league tables based on the 
different proportions of state income allocated. Such tables (circa. 2016) show the UK in 5th 
place below Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden and Denmark, with Germany and the 
Netherlands in 6th and 7th places respectively. The United States is in 23rd place, just above 
Portugal and Hungary. Such ranking exercises, even without further commentary, enact an 
overt critique of the countries with extremely low percentage allocations, with the United 
                                                     
7 Kaufman’s formulation has its origin in Renee Fox and Judith Swazey’s (1992) influential work.  
8 https://petition.parliament.uk/archived/petitions/125692 
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States, for instance, spending just 0.17% of its national income on overseas development 
aid.9 The UK was praised by Bill Gates for its ‘“absolutely fantastic’ decision to [take the 
lead] in embrac[ing] the UN target of spending 0.7% of GNI (gross national income) on 
overseas aid by 2013’.10 On the other hand, ‘even without Trump’s proposed cuts [of a 
drastic 28% to its aid budget], [the] US fails to lead’.11 So far as the UK is concerned, then, a 
kind of anti-hauntology of the gift was generated since commentary focused not on the 
shadow side of the gift and attendant unsaved lives but rather on what had been given and 
the quantity of lives positively affected. For instance, the chief executive of the charity Save 
the Children praised Cameron for his role in organizing a conference – central to his ODA 
target figure commitment – on child vaccinations: ‘Probably a million lives have been saved 
since Cameron called the vaccines summit [in June 2011]’.12  
 
And yet, in the reader comments section below the online version of the newspaper article 
just cited, we find such responses as: ‘What about our own children going hungry to school 
and parents having to rely on charitable foodbanks? Our elderly people having their care 
services cut… Our disabled people having to endure repeated medical tests so their 
disability benefits can be cut. All in the name of reducing the deficit’. Specifically in response 
to the byline ‘Prime Minister says ahead of hunger summit that even in tough times it is 
right to help the world’s poor and malnourished’ we find the comment: ‘Of course. Unless 
they’re our own’. We see how shadow gift relations enact critique. For some, that which the 
UK gives in foreign aid brings into focus that which is ungiven in welfare spending within the 
UK. Meanwhile the very existence of gifts of food in the form of charitable food banks – the 
coming into existence of which almost exactly coincided with the beginning of Cameron’s 
‘era of austerity’ – enacts the critique of the stringent welfare cuts that makes their function 
so vital. If ‘the rollback of the state has created levels of poverty last seen in the UK in the 
1900s’ (Thane 2018), it is the gift of food via food banks that makes the injustice of the 
state’s welfare cuts for the most vulnerable most dramatically visible and therefore open to 
critique. 
 
Turning to philanthropy: If on occasion the ‘extreme’ generosity displayed by various 
wealthy individuals can been taken to demonstrate the insufficiency of governments that 
cannot or do not give, evidencing lack of care for their vulnerable citizens (Osella 2018: 32), 
unsurprisingly the giving actions of wealthy individuals are equally open to partonomic 
and/or taxonomic critique. Take Jeff Bezos, founder of the Amazon corporation and 
reportedly the richest individual in history, who has been the subject of commentary 
highlighting a deficit in philanthropic commitment. Even after it was made public in 2019 
that he was not only the world’s wealthiest individual but also its biggest philanthropic 
benefactor, the news was met with faint praise. The Guardian’s headline, for instance, read: 
‘World's richest man finally tops list of biggest donors’ (emphasis added).13 If his charity 
now ‘matched his wealth’, well, better late than never. Prior to achieving this more 
adequate proportional ‘match’, his ‘stingy reputation’ had been much reported:  
 
                                                     
9 http://theconversation.com/us-foreign-aid-explained-74810 
10 The Guardian, 13 June 2011.  
11 http://theconversation.com/us-foreign-aid-explained-74810 
12 The Guardian, 10 Aug. 2012.  
13 The Guardian, 26 Feb. 2019. 
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Bezos has long had a reputation for being unusually stingy, even for a 
multibillionaire. He is the only one of the world’s top five billionaires not to have 
signed Warren Buffett’s giving pledge [to donate half their wealth to philanthropic 
causes], and his philanthropic efforts so far have paled next to those of other 
prominent corporate titans like Bill Gates and even Mark Zuckerberg. Instead, he has 
used his money to purchase the largest luxury home in Washington DC (converting 
the 27,000 sq ft Textile Museum into a single-family residence). Unlike his 
brother, Mark Bezos, a volunteer firefighter who runs an anti-poverty organization 
called Robin Hood, Jeff has confined himself to a few highly idiosyncratic forms of 
charity, such as handing out free bananas on the streets of Seattle.14 
 
Bezos’s acts of (not) giving are evaluated according to techniques of ‘contrastive perception’ 
(Suralles 2016). In addition to the cuttingly personal familial contrast with his socially-
minded brother, the proportions of their wealth allotted to philanthropic causes by similarly 
wealthy individuals are referred to as a means of contrastively contextualising the nature of 
his – i.e., their gifts are made to critique his via the mobilization of a contrastive 
proportional ethics. First, unlike Zuckerberg et al, we are informed that Bezos has failed to 
pledge half of his fortune to philanthropy. Second, even after he had gained the status of 
the world’s single highest net donor, the proportion of his wealth donated relative to theirs 
was found to be wanting. In its comparative critique, The Daily Mail didn’t mince its words:  
 
Bottom of the table! Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos ‘gives less than 0.1 per cent of his 
$160bn fortune to charity’ and is put in the shade by philanthropist Bill Gates, Mark 
Zuckerberg and President Trump. 
- World's wealthiest man donated just 0.0906 per cent of his considerable wealth 
- Bill and Melinda Gates gave away 37 per cent of their fortune, figures show 
- Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg and his wife Priscilla Chan gave away four per cent 
and even President Trump donated three per cent of his $3 billion fortune.15 
 
It was not only The Daily Mail: proportional critique abounded. Take Vox: ‘$2 billion is a 
meagre amount of money relative to the giving plans of other billionaires. He is committing 
about 1.3 percent of his total net worth during a year in which his pocketbook doubled in 
size thanks to Amazon’s bull run’.16 However, critique of Bezos’s giving was based not only 
on a sense of its inadequate proportions but also on the matter of its kind. A Guardian 
article that offers Bezos advice on how he might ‘change his stingy reputation’ reports his 
use of Twitter to seek ideas for worthy philanthropic causes: ‘He quickly received all manner 
of ideas from the public [in excess of 47,000 of them], ranging from paying off student loans 
to stopping climate change to building data centres in Africa. Some even proposed saving 
the actual Amazon’.17 However, if Bezos sought to imagine the ‘kind’ of his giving in 
accordance with philanthropic conventions associated with wealthy elites, the comment 
piece pointed out that ‘If Bezos is looking for a population in need of his support, Amazon’s 
workers perfectly fit the bill’; i.e. the gift he seeks to give becomes an occasion for critique 
                                                     
15 Daily Mail, 26 Feb. 2019. 
15 Daily Mail, 26 Feb. 2019. 
16 https://www.vox.com/2018/9/13/17855950/jeff-bezos-donation-2-billion-philanthropy-charity-amazon-ceo 
The phrase ‘bull run’ here refers to the remarkable rise in Amazon share prices.  
17 The Guardian, 28 July 2017.  
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of labour conditions at the company he founded. There follows a long list of the ways in 
which Amazon workers across the world suffer from mental health issues, exhaustion, low 
pay and more. In this commentary, the spectral other of the gift Bezos sought to make 
(crowd-sourced, blockbuster, hubristic) was a gift of a different order rather than of a 
different magnitude: the quieter ‘gift’ of employee rights and welfare. Here, then, the 
virtual other of the actual philanthropy Bezos now funds is not quite a possible gift but the 
possibility of alleviating an ongoing situation: that of exploitative and demeaning labour 
conditions at Amazon warehouses. We thus register a shift from a shadow gift relation 
existing between proportions to one existing more flexibly between kinds or entities.  
 
A BBC news article from 2019 provides an example that both exemplifies and complicates 
the argument so far presented.18 The focus was the achievement of Indian IT billionaire 
Azim Premji in becoming the country’s most generous philanthropic giver.19 But recognition 
of the billionaire’s largesse quickly gives way in the piece to commentary on the absence of 
giving by other members of the country’s wealthy elite: indeed, the report is headlined, 
‘Why India’s rich don’t give their money away’. Premji may have ‘seal[ed] his place among 
the world’s top givers. But his generosity has put philanthropy in the spotlight in a country 
where charity does not appear to match wealth’. The disproportion is telling. As the author 
of a report on philanthropy in India puts it: ‘If you look at those who have the money, they 
are not giving it’. Once more, what you see (the gift) is what you do not get: critique of the 
gift follows closely the gift itself. Premji, then, is framed as ‘a magnanimous “outlier”’ in the 
world of South Asian philanthropy as ‘the first Indian billionaire to sign the Giving Pledge, an 
initiative by Mr Gates and Mr Buffet that encourages wealthy individuals to pledge half their 
fortunes to philanthropy’. In this way, the news item highlights a transparently proportional 
outlook on the gift alongside an array of reputed facts and figures about rates of Indian 
giving. But at the same time, ambiguity surfaces with a recognition that undercuts its 
argument: namely, that in this region ‘many people give anonymously’ – and it is indeed the 
case that a key genre of gifting in India is the gift that is given in secret. Claims such as 
‘India’s rich do not give their money away’ assume that giving is everywhere and always a 
visible act: that a gift, once given, can be known to have been given. Thus, while such secret 
giving might appear locally specific (a particular local gift modality albeit with various 
equivalents elsewhere), it reminds us that a shadow gift relation is a relation formed of the 
imagination: the relation is, indeed, shadowy, based frequently as it is on calculations 
comprising unknowable quantities. As we noted earlier, the totality out of which a gift 
emerges is imagined and therefore constitutively indeterminate (Sneath, Holbraad and 
Pedersen 2009: 24). Meanwhile, the actualised gift may be equally invisible and subject to 
speculative imagination. To reframe our earlier analytic, then: what you get is what you do 
not see. 
 
So if, as we have been arguing, the gift (that is actually given) may form a model for a gift 
that could be, we might consider it also to be a form of prototype, with the actual intimating 
the possible. A prototype, as Corsín Jiménez (2014: 383) explains, has qualities of porosity 
                                                     
18 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-47566542, dated 2 April 2019.  
19 His firm, Wipro, is an icon of India’s IT sector. Premji ‘was just 21 when he dropped out of Stanford 
University to join Wipro, a company his father started in 1945. (He went back and finished school in 2000). 
Under him, Wipro, a refinery for vegetable oils, grew into one of India's biggest and most successful IT services 
firms’ (ibid). 
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and indefiniteness – and the gift that is haunted by another version of itself that may yet 
come to pass, rather like a prototype, is a ‘thing-that-is-not quite-adequately-a-gift-yet’. And 
such uncertainty is even before the possibility of its being given in secret. The commentary 
on the case of Premji notes how a gift’s visibility (and therefore knowledge of its quantity or 
kind or very existence at all) is far from being guaranteed, highlighting how the sorts of 
evaluation that allow for a gift to be conceptualised as being otherwise, prototypical or 
haunted rely on some sort of publicity, if not solid facts. And certainly, in India the gift given 
in secret (called gupt-dan) is a long-established and popular genre of giving that is 
particularly revered because it is immune from the ‘immediate reward of an increase in a 
donor’s public status, and people say that because of this the unseen reward which comes 
as merit or good karma will be greater’ (Laidlaw 1995: 297).20 But while a gift given in true 
secrecy cannot be subject to morally-freighted public commentaries relating its actual and 
virtual versions, slippages between can and ought might figure nonetheless in a private 
giver’s own moral calculus. If a friend runs the London Marathon for charity and I donate 
anonymously on their Just Giving webpage, the quantities donated by others are visible 
(with some contributors named and others anonymous). One’s gift is given because of one’s 
friendship and sense of the value of the charity being supported – but also in relation to the 
quantities on display, the resources that one has access to (and one’s hopes and fears in 
respect of them), and one’s sense of the appropriate level of compassion. In this way, we 
may discern both private as well as public hauntologies of the gift. Take as another example 
a debate on the issue of guilt and appropriate levels of giving hosted by a website 
specialising in securing and managing wealth. One contributor confesses: ‘what I am 
struggling with right now is exactly the “great privilege = great responsibility” piece of the 
equation. I want to give back more and I’m trying to figure out how much we “should” be 
contributing to charity and other causes we believe in. We are high earners but also save 
quite a bit, live in a smaller house (in a walkable neighbourhood), have 1 car, etc. We have a 
lovely life, we just purposely design it to be on the frugal end of the spectrum. We have 
always given to charity but again I don’t think we give enough, and that is why I am trying to 
figure out the right way to quantify this. Maybe it really is as simple as the 10% tithe 
concept (although to charities etc. vs. strictly to a religious organization)? Any thoughts 
appreciated…’21 The individual donating subject, then, who may or may not give in secret, is 
also apt to evaluate, question, reflect on and make judgments about his or her own giving 
practices.   
 
According to Allen Buchanan, in Western ethical traditions ‘both the kind and amount of aid 
[a person] renders and the choice of a recipient are left to the discretion of the individual. 
Thus you and I have a duty to aid the poor, but how we render aid, how much aid we 
render, and to whom among the poor we render aid is a matter of our choice’ (1996: 99). 
Indeed, Buchanan continues, ‘since one individual cannot be expected to aid all of the poor, 
the idea that duties to aid are “imperfect” makes perfectly good sense: It is up to the 
individual to choose what sort of aid to provide, how much of it to give, and upon whom to 
bestow it’ (102). In theory, maybe. But, as we have seen, gifts in practice are subject to 
evaluation both privately and publicly according to criteria of the possible - the idea that the 
gift could possibly be very different than it is, and that the precipitative force of the gift’s 
                                                     
20 See also Bercovitch (1994) on concealed exchanges in Papua New Guinea.  
21 https://www.getrichslowly.org/guilt-of-wealth/ 
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virtual other might partake of the powers that could transform the world into something 
better (Guyer 2009: 362).  
 
 
Shadow gift relations and their temporalities 
 
A gift’s potential, central to this essay, is a particular dimension of the gift’s multifaceted 
temporal affordances. If temporal aspects of gift-giving have received analytical attention, 
the potential of the gift as a distinct aspect of the gift’s temporal dimension remains under-
conceptualised.22 Potential, as we further discuss below, may be coercive, but it may also 
deal in the hopeful subjunctive: the gift might be other than that given. To explore this 
matter, we turn to a case study that draws on our long-term ethnographic research in north 
Indian blood donation and transfusion settings (conducted intermittently since 2003). The 
backdrop consists of longstanding but ill-organised state-led efforts to boost voluntary, non-
remunerated blood donation in place of the predominant paid and family-replacement 
varieties, modes of giving considered by international arbiters of health policy, such as the 
WHO, to place transfusion recipients at heightened danger of infection and the relatives of 
patients under undue stress.23 The form of wealth given over, or shared here, then, is not 
money but rather blood.24 While a very different modality of gift from those discussed 
above, its focus on upliftment as a dutiful contribution to civic life, alongside its generality 
and anonymity (such gifts are directed untraceably to anyone in need), mean it might be 
glossed as ‘expressive of charitable or philanthropic dispositions, and indeed be analysed as 
such’ (Osella 2018: 8). For though the principal stated reason for the promotion of voluntary 
donation is the requirement to improve the safety of donated blood, its anonymity connects 
it to the kind of giving that is widely favoured in a host of other contexts both within and 
beyond India in which philanthropic action is considered to be both modern and moral only 
when directed untraceably to anyone in need. Indeed, both are pervaded by ‘rhetorics of 
voluntarism’ and a moral imagination, whereby ‘a potential giver is connected to unknown 
others by means of anonymous, philanthropic skeins’ (Simpson 2011: 273). The switch from 
a replacement to a voluntary mode of donation appears to instill blood donation activity 
with the anonymity and generality characteristic of this modernist philanthropic principle.  
 
Normatively speaking, voluntary donations should take place according to a particular time 
map -- namely, repetition at three-month intervals (the hematological equivalent of a 
monetary standing order). This is in contrast to apparently less civic-minded blood donation 
modes: the potentially dangerous commercial transaction of ‘professional’ (the vernacular 
for paid or commercial) donation, and the one-time mode of family-replacement donation, 
performed in order to release blood for the benefit of one’s immediate family member in 
need of transfusion. These modes of donation are thus characterized by different 
temporalities. A routine of dutiful, repetitive bloodshed structures voluntary blood 
donation’s ‘time of the civic’ (Bear 2014: 27). Institutional medical demand for blood is 
                                                     
22 See e.g. Derrida (1992) on gifts out of time, Bourdieu (2000) on the tactical timing of acts of giving, Strathern 
(2013) on intervals, sequencing, and revelatory instants in gift exchange, Ssorin-Chaikov’s (2006) majestic 
study of heterochronic gifting practices in Soviet Russia, and Copeman (2005) on gifts of time. 
23 In ‘replacement’ blood donation, relatives of recipients are asked to replace (in advance) the blood they 
require.  
24 See Street (2009), Carsten (2011) and Copeman (2009) on commonalities between money and blood.  
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continuous: the iterative presumption of a single voluntary blood donation in time is that it 
forms one of a series (Strathern 2017: 201). In Kockelman and Bernstein’s (2012: 322) 
terms, voluntary blood donation foregrounds temporality as metricality: ‘the repetition of 
tokens of a common event type’. 
 
During our fieldwork, we found that promoters of voluntary blood donation enacted a 
temporal critique of the one-time replacement gift of blood. To reiterate: the one-time 
replacement gift is the long-standing norm of blood donation in India that the newer ideal 
of anonymous, voluntary giving seeks to supersede. The new ideal of anonymity - vouched 
for by global public health as safer and more efficient - characterizes the mode of one-time 
replacement as wasteful: gifts that could have been given, if repeated over time according 
to the ideal of four possible gifts per year, remain ungiven. Thus, if voluntary blood donation 
over time (preferably four times a year) represents the ‘actualization of the potentials that 
are virtually present in our lives’ (Mazzarella 2010: 723), one-time replacement giving 
represents the extinguishing of such potentials.  
 
The figure of the ungiven gift of blood is an object of particular pathos and sentimentality in 
the field of blood banking in north India. This is because those tasked with promoting 
voluntary blood donation systematically translate the blood that remains ungiven into a 
logic of lives unsaved (which potentially could have been lives saved). These logics were 
captured at a training event for about 15 new voluntary blood donor recruiters that took 
place in one of Delhi’s more modern blood banks, established in the early 2000s by an 
international charitable society. Each blood bank has an attached donor recruiter or ‘social 
worker’ whose tasks, unlike other blood bank staff, are non-technical. Instead, their work 
involves liaising with corporate, educational and religious institutions (churches, temples 
etc.) for the organization of blood giving events. More generally, they are also responsible 
for promoting voluntary blood giving as a positive, life-saving, community-building activity 
that does no harm to the donor. The problem is that many recruiters are just as fearful of 
donating their blood as the members of the public they are tasked with motivating.25 
Trainers responsible for professionalizing blood donor recruitment seek to address this 
discrepancy with the aim of making recruitment activities more consistent and convincing.  
 
One such trainer was a blood bank medic from a nearby town who also runs a small NGO 
promoting voluntary blood giving. He was concerned that blood donor motivation should 
not be ‘just a job’ for the trainee recruiters, but a visceral commitment. Successful recruiters 
were motivators of conviction, he told his audience. A centerpiece of the training workshop 
was a procedure of rhetorical mathematics in which, it was clear to us, the trainer was 
practiced. First of all, he went around the room gathering the ages of the trainees and the 
number of times they professed to having given their blood. Next, he wrote these figures on 
a whiteboard. There followed a public calculation of opportunity cost figures for each novice 
recruiter. Knowing the age of each recruiter allowed the trainer to calculate the maximum 
number of times they could have donated their blood, and to then subtract from that figure 
the number of actually performed donations in order to arrive at a total number of each 
trainee’s opportunity cost, or phantom, blood gifts. For instance, a person who is 37 years 
                                                     
25 See Copeman and Banerjee (2019) on fears widespread in South Asia concerning blood donation as an 
irrecoverably depletive activity.  
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old has been eligible to donate their blood for 19 years, i.e. since turning 18. Normally, 4 
whole blood donations are possible per year. 19 years of eligibility multiplied by 4 donations 
per year gives a figure of 76 possible donations. The number of actual donations was then 
subtracted from this figure. 
 
But the trainer was not finished. The technology of blood component separation splits a 
single donated blood unit qualitatively and quantitatively into three transfusable units 
(made up of red blood cells, platelets and plasma, respectively). The procedure is carried 
out on donated blood units in a centrifuge machine in order to both better treat patients 
and preserve a scare resource. The technology is significant for it determines that the 
number of donations given is not the same as the number of ‘lives saved’. Following from 
this, in a further dramatic numerical maneuver the trainer rhetorically tripled the numbers 
of lives not saved by each trainee: so, for instance, the above-mentioned trainee whose 
phantom gifts amounted to 70 (76 possible donations minus the 6 actually given), according 
to the arithmetic of component separation, in fact ‘failed’ to save the lives of 210 patients. 
The climax came when the trainer added together the trainees’ individual ungiven gifts to 
arrive at an overall figure of well over a thousand ‘unsaved’ patients. The trainer thus spelt 
out to the trainees the partonomic relation between their given donations and those 
remaining ungiven as an act of criticism, with that which has been given not being subject to 
acclaim but instead only serving mathematically to underscore that which has not. However 
tendentious such an exercise of the arithmetical shaming of trainees might be26, its 
rhetorical effect was very much evident, with several of them moved to tears. To reiterate: 
a donation not given, which separated into components would save three, translates into a 
logic of lives not saved. A hauntology of the gift, indeed; in which, again, it is the gap 
between the given and ungiven in which critique resides or through which critique is 
generated.   
 
The trainer’s intention of inculcating embodied consistency between the role and person of 
trainees thus drew on an interactive methodology of making explicit the possible number of 
recipients of ungiven donations: relying on the ubiquity of the equation (rhetorical rather 
than actual) in the donor recruitment field between quantity of donations made and 
number of lives ‘saved’, the trainer effectively conjures the ghostly magnitude of the 
unsaved. Since, in this particular case, the ungiven and the unsaved run together so closely, 
we find in it the hauntedness of the gift at its highest pitch. Through a morally loaded 
practice of numerical pedagogy – a kind of critical quantification of the shadow gift relation 
– the truths of the urgency of the recruiter’s task, and that of the need for constancy in 
pursuing it, are established.  
 
                                                     
26 The assumptions reflected in the exercise do not bear close scrutiny since although there is a shortage of 
blood in terms of stock levels adequate for a conventional voluntary system, since the system in practice is 
mixed – comprising voluntary, replacement, paid and even directed donations -- it is difficult to determine how 
often patients in fact die for want of blood. Moreover, many doctors ask blood banks for whole blood rather 
than components, so the assumption that donations are ‘tripled’ via their division into three is more a 
counterfactual rhetorical device than an objective calculation of opportunity costs. Further, each transfusion, 
at least in theory, is made up of more than a single unit – so in a double sense, then, it is rarely if ever a case of 
one donated unit saving one life. Finally, many transfusions form just a part of larger treatment regimes and so 
are often not obviously isolable as ‘lifesaving’ in a discrete sense.  
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The tyranny of the (potential) gift?  
 
In the above discussion we saw how a trainer in Delhi maps phantom gifts according to a set 
of temporal particulars, with trainees’ ages and dates of birth measured against a rhythm of 
four possible blood gifts per year. In order for the relation between the given and the 
withheld to be invoked as the basis of moral commentary (here, by the trainer) – as 
thwarted potential – we see how the ungiven gift remains ungiven in time. Thus, a specific 
species of temporal politics arises, which we unpack with reference to recent 
anthropological writing on potential. Indeed, the sense that a gift might (auto)critique by 
way of its shadow relation with a virtual, ungiven form of itself illuminates well the political 
dimension of potential (Taussig, Hoeyer and Helmreich 2013). 
 
Taussig, Hoeyer and Helmreich (2013: 6) call attention to how articulations of potential are 
imbricated with the political in making claims on individuals to behave in particular ways; 
namely, to act in a manner that may be said to fulfil that potential: as we noted earlier, ‘can’ 
comes to imply ‘ought’. Such claims may take the form of moral injunctions. The authors 
give the example of a biobank articulated as having the potential to transform biomedicine. 
Given such potential, it becomes morally incumbent on medical or state authorities to fund 
it. We see, they argue, ‘how naming and framing something in terms of potential has 
political effects in the world’ (10). In the same collection, Sharon Kaufmann (2013) describes 
the coercive effects such invocations can have as ‘the tyranny of potential’. In the US cases 
she describes, since it is now possible to actualise the potential for longevity via living 
kidney donations, the matter becomes a fait accompli: the passing into common sense of 
the notion of the ‘spare’ kidney makes it all-too-donatable – for instance, by the young to 
the old (Kaufman [2013: 60] calls this ‘donating up the generations’). New potentials result 
in new obligations, however biologically intrusive and possibly damaging the actualised 
reality may be for donors. To translate the cases analysed by Kaufman into the conceptual 
approach we have been developing in this essay, we might say that the potential that 
medics and others ascribe to this modality of biomedical gift creates phantoms out of 
ungiven kidneys. Once more, the ungiven gift, as unactualized potential, is a form of 
critique.  
 
This example is significant because it allows us to finesse our understanding of the potential 
gift. The shadow gift relation as a (critical) technology of the imagination can be variably put 
to use. On the one hand, the virtual other of the actual gift might be experienced as ‘the 
vice-like grip of duty’s iron fist’ (Edelman 2004: 159) – an oppressive, coercive, possibly 
depletive ought. On the other, it might serve to highlight unjust hoarding, avaricious 
withholding and the conceitedness of the gift as given27 – arguably a necessary, beneficent 
ought. Inevitably, whether the relation is considered to have effects that are tyrannical or 
valuable will be dependent on the evaluator’s structural position, with the two versions of 
ought just noted either not self-evidently one or the other or simply assessed differently by 
different parties. From our point of view, the case of the blood donor recruiters discussed 
earlier shares features with Kaufman’s analysis of the tyranny of potential, with the 
mathematical exercise and units of blood that have been given only serving to call attention, 
                                                     
27 See Copeman and Banerjee (2019: 227-228) for a striking example of exactly this.  
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by obviation, to the units that could have given but were not. The virtual gift haunts the 
given one: because more blood donations could have been given, they should have been 
given, too. Virtual gifts are deployed to induce shame within those who arguably have no 
reason to feel it – withholding essentially being made to equate with manslaughter. 
(Of course, from the trainer’s point of view, his approach is defensible as being in the 
service of the higher goal of self-consistent donor recruiters, and ultimately, saving lives). 
 
But equally certain moral obligations are, of course, entirely necessary and desirable. If 
potentiality implies that things could be other than they are, it is the same subjunctive 
quality that implies that a gift could be other than it is (i.e., other than that given) – in the 
sense of positive possibility, or legitimate critique of the withholding of aid or assistance. 
For example, in our view it is less easy to locate the tyranny of the potential gift in the 
following example in which the virtual gift is conjured as a simple plea for fairness. In an 
earlier paper (Banerjee and Copeman 2018), also drawing on our north Indian fieldwork, we 
described activist responses to the Bhopal Gas Disaster of 1984.28 There we analysed a 
species of gift that activists intentionally cause to be haunted by a gift that has been 
withheld – that of state medical assistance and medical care. Very briefly: the Indian 
government has failed to provide adequate healthcare to the survivors of the disaster, 
refusing to prosecute the corporations responsible or recognize obvious signs of second-
generation effects and also failing to deliver upon promises of public medical research into 
the chronic effects of this poisoning. In one of several strategies employed, activist children 
ask volunteers to cut out large paper hearts of various colours and pen a letter on them to 
the prime minister. The name of the campaign gives away its affective ploy. The ‘Have a 
Heart, Prime Minister’ campaign is built on the idea that these carved hearts are donations 
to the prime minister to be transplanted for his obviously missing organ. If his heart were 
indeed in its place, it would not allow him to turn a deaf ear to the suffering of the activist-
children. The gift of the heart (again) is indicative of the ‘gift’ not given—that of state 
assistance and medical care. For these activists the emphasis, once more, is not on what a 
gift is but on what a gift should be, and the mechanism for conjuring such a virtual gift is 
precisely a gift (albeit a pseudo one). So whereas in the earlier case it was the trainer’s 
commentary on the (non)gifts of others that brought to light the phantom or virtual gifts 
that were not (but could have been) given, what we find in the Bhopal case is the 
intentional haunting by the givers themselves of their (pseudo-) gifts by an ‘otherwise’ form. 
We can thus begin to appreciate the dynamic flexibility of the virtual gift as a critical 
modality. Gifts given conjure gifts ungiven, but the subject position of the commentator 
cannot be pre-determined. In each case, however, activist critique operates by calling forth 
(imagining) a virtual gift in the sense of the virtual we defined earlier as ‘a potential which 
serves to constantly bring new “actual” entities into being’ (Bialecki 2012: 307). At least, 
that is what is intended: what we have called the shadow gift relation between the given 
and non-given – operationalized critically – is intended to lead blood donor recruiters to 
donate blood more frequently and also to encourage the Indian Prime Minister to keep his 
promise to give medical and financial assistance to Bhopal survivors. That is, the virtual gift 
is intended to bring new ‘actual’ gifts into being. We thus see the dynamic flexibility that 
                                                     
28 In 1984, a poisonous cloud of methyl isocyanate leaked out of a negligently maintained Union Carbide plant 
in Bhopal.  Over the course of the night, the gas cloud quickly engulfed the slum settlements that surround the 
factory, leading to the immediate death of over two thousand. The disaster overwhelmingly affected the 
marginalized inhabitants of the city that lived in squatter settlements and worked in the informal economy.  
 15 
characterises how a charitable gift may act as an incitement to critical discourse 
(commentary, evaluation) and become subject to moral judgements.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The charitable gift, this essay has tried to show, is well capable of narrating both its own and 
others’ giving infelicities. We can speculate about whether we could ever find a charitable 
gift that was ever fully itself, present or ‘settled’ -- a gift that would be neither subject to nor 
an agent of criticism. Even in the unlikely event that a public charitable donation was judged 
to be of adequate proportions and kind, and therefore not itself open to critique, such a 
donation would, through contrastive perception, be all the more equipped for critiquing 
other public gifts deemed infelicitous in precisely those aspects. As the Gospel of Luke put 
it:  
 
 
Just then he looked up and saw the rich people dropping offerings in the collection 
plate. Then he saw a poor widow put in two pennies. He said, ‘The plain truth is that 
this widow has given by far the largest offering today. All these others made 
offerings that they’ll never miss; she gave extravagantly what she couldn’t afford—
she gave her all!’  
        Luke 21:1-4 
 
Key to our analysis here has been acknowledging that which remains ungiven. Weiner’s 
paper ‘Inalienable wealth’ (1985) succinctly lays out her argument concerning the salience 
of that which is kept back. For Weiner, ‘the object rather than the act of reciprocity plays 
the dominant role’ (211). Similarly focusing on the object and how forms of wealth may be 
kept back, we have also sought to analytically expand the kind of relations exchange 
comprises. Like Weiner we have been concerned with ‘keeping things instead of giving them 
away’ (Weiner 1985), but also with imagined relations between that that which is given and 
that kept, or between that which is given and that which could be or might have been given.  
 
This brings us back to questions of pathos and critique: pathos, because thinking about the 
gift that is given in relation to the potential for something else to have been given discloses 
limits and constraints in social relations (see Simmel 1971); critique, because what might 
have been given is capable of placing into critical relief the nature of what actually is. To pay 
attention to the otherwise of giving is to notice how the actually given, in relation to that 
which remains ungiven, provokes commentaries composed of critical reflection and moral 
evaluation that are frequently marked by consequential slippages between ‘can’ and 
‘ought’. The shadow gift relation is the shape taken by the gap between how things are and 
how they ideally ought to be in contexts of gift transfer: a critical haunting of the ‘is’-gift by 
its alternative virtual modalities. Weiner rightly notes that ‘The value created by keeping 
must be seen in relation to the constant threats and needs of giving’ (224). If she was able 
to advance anthropological theory of the gift through scrutinizing this relation in terms of 
alienability, we suggest it can be elucidated further by examining it spectrally: the gift that 
exists beyond the living present, beside itself.    
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Giving is also keeping (withholding). The relation between these elements of an act of giving 
is neither inert nor is it, so to speak, given. Giving is thus a technology of the imagination 
because it is a process which precipitates the imagination of a relation between an 
actual/visible/present gift and a double that is virtual/invisible/absent but nonetheless real 
because it exists in the form of a ‘manifold of potentials for how [the gift] could be’ 
(Holbraad, Pedersen, and Viveiros de Castro 2014) and that might indeed be realised. Hence 
the critical possibilities of a gift: an effect of the shadow gift relation, which means that a 
gift is never just itself, but always potentially something else as well. 
 
Such a shadow gift relation between the gift as given and its virtual others is central to the 
moral evaluation of giving episodes, with could be or could have been gifts invoked as a 
force of rhetoric in assessing appropriate levels of commitment as well as instruments of 
intervention in public debates about levels and kinds of giving. Lauren Berlant (2004: 10) 
asks: ‘What is the relation between becoming capaciously compassionate and becoming 
distant from responsibility for what one experiences directly and indirectly about the 
populations relegated to social negativity? What if it turns out that compassion and 
coldness are not opposite at all but are two sides of a bargain that the subjects of modernity 
have struck with structural inequality?’ This essay has shown that such a relation between 
capacious compassion and distance from responsibility is present within the ideation of a 
‘single’ gift – the two sides of the same gift. It has also sought to show how acknowledging 
the imagined relation between the actually given and an ungiven that haunts it is important 
for understanding how potential operates as a powerful political dimension in contexts of 
charitable giving. Signalling that the possibility of a different gift exists is the first step in 
eventuating such a gift. Moving such a gift into the actual domain from the virtual one may 
well be entirely necessary (see e.g. the case of Bhopal discussed above). Yet virtual modes 
of donation resist easy moral accounting, for the possibility of a gift – as scholarship on 
biological forms of gift has shown with particular vividness – can also lead to an irresistible 
sense that it must be given, that if acted upon, might be far from being in the donor’s own 
interests. 
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